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ABSTRACT
By allowing users to obscure their transactions via including “mix-
ins” (chaff coins), ring signature schemes have been widely used
to protect a sender’s identity of a transaction in privacy-preserving
blockchain systems, like Monero and Bytecoin. However, recent
works point out that the existing ring signature scheme is vulnera-
ble to the “chain-reaction” analysis (i.e., the spent coin in a given
ring signature can be deduced through elimination). Especially,
when the diversity of mixins is low, the spent coin will have a
high risk to be detected. To overcome the weakness, the ring sig-
nature should be consisted of a set of mixins with high diversity
and produce observations having “similar” distributions for any
two coins. In this paper, we propose a notion, namely -coin-
indistinguishability (-CI), to formally define the “similar” distri-
bution guaranteed through a differential privacy scheme. Then,
we formally define the CI-aware mixins selection problem with
disjoint-superset constraint (CIA-MS-DS), which aims to find a
mixin set that has maximal diversity and satisfies the constraints
of -CI and the budget. In CIA-MS-DS, each ring signature is ei-
ther disjoint with or the superset of its preceding ring signatures.
We prove that CIA-MS-DS is NP-hard and thus intractable. To
solve the CIA-MS-DS problem, we propose two approximation al-
gorithms, namely the Progressive Algorithm and the Game Theo-
retic Algorithm, with theoretic guarantees. Through extensive ex-
periments on both real data sets and synthetic data sets, we demon-
strate the efficiency and the effectiveness of our approaches.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Recently, with the success of cryptocurrencies (e.g., Bitcoin [1],
Ethereum [2]) and blockchain products (e.g., Thunderchain [3]),
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Figure 1: The Unspent Transaction Output (UTXO) model
blockchain technologies have attracted much attention from both
academia (e.g., database community [4] [5]) and industry (e.g.,
supply chain management [6], healthcare [7] and bank [8]). In gen-
eral, blockchain is a secure data structure maintained by untrusted
peers in a decentralized P2P network. It has many valuable features
such as transparency, provenance, fault tolerance, and authenticity.
However, transparency property of blockchain can initiate pri-
vacy problem, that is, in many real-world applications where users
want to keep the transaction information by themselves. For in-
stance, in a trading system, a trader may hope to conceal the in-
formation of her/his trade partner who received (sent) money from
(to) her/him. Furthermore, the transaction information can be eas-
ily linked to a variety of other information that an individual usually
wishes to protect. For example, in a blockchain-based ride-hailing
system, like MVL [9], there are massive users’ location data. By
collecting and processing transaction data, it is possible to infer the
user’s personal information such as addresses of home [10].
To protect privacy, researchers have proposed some privacy def-
initions [11] [12] and privacy-preserving methods [12] [13] [14].
In [11], T. Okamoto and K. Ohta introduced that “privacy” must be
one criterion of ideal electronic cash, which means “the relation-
ship between the user and his purchases must be untraceable by
anyone”. Van Saberhagen proposed that “Untraceability” must be
satisfied for a fully anonymous electronic cash model [12], which
refers to “for each incoming transaction all possible senders are
equiprobable”. To satisfy the untraceability, ring signature (RS)
schemes were widely implemented in famous privacy-preserving
blockchain systems, like Monero [15] and Bytecoin [16]. Users
can utilize RS schemes to obscure transactions by including chaff
coins, called “mixins”, along with coins they will spend. As shown
in Figure 1, in UTXO model blockchains, there are multiple inputs
and outputs in a transaction. Each input is represented by a RS,
and each output is a coin. Each RS contains a coin which is spent
in the transaction, marked in yellow color, and many other coins
as mixins marked in green color. Each coin can only be spent in
a RS. The diversity of a RS’s mixins is measured by the number
of historical transactions outputting them. Since the RS scheme’s
efficiency (generation and verification time) affects its verification
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Figure 2: Motivation Example.
time and transaction fee, researchers are motivated to improve its
efficiency from O(n) in [12] to O(logn) in [14], where n is the
number of mixins in each RS.
In contrast to extensive researches in the RS scheme’s efficiency,
the researches of its effectiveness on preserving privacy remain
rather scarce. Currently, the effectiveness of a RS is roughly es-
timated as the number of mixins, like many k-anonymity meth-
ods [17] [18], and the current RS scheme randomly picks mix-
ins [15]. The current RS scheme has two pivotal shortcomings:
a) it is vulnerable to “chain-reaction” analysis [19]; b) it lacks of
consideration on the diversity of mixins [20].
For the first weakness of the current RS scheme, through the
“chain-reaction” analysis, it is possible to infer spent coins in RSs
by leveraging the traffic flow and eliminating the mixins which
must have been spent in other RSs. A RS r can be the signifi-
cant affected by the related RSs which have overlapped coins with
r. We illustrate the “chain-reaction” analysis in Example 1. For
simplicity, in the remaining paper, we consider a RS as the union
of mixins and the spent coin.
Example 1 (“Chain-Reaction” Analysis). There are four RSs, r1 =
{c1, c2, c3}, r2 = {c1, c2}, r3 = {c1, c2} and r4 = {c1, c2, c3, c4,
c5, c6, c7}, where c1 ∼ c7 are 7 coins. Then, for c1 and c2, r2
produces observations to witnesses with high similarity, since the
probability of each coin being spent in r2 is the same. The observa-
tion of a coin in a RS is the probability of the coin being spent in the
RS, when the coin is spent. But for c2 and c3, r1 produces obser-
vations with low similarity, since it is deduced that c3 is the spent
coin in r1. Since r2 and r3 only contain c1 and c2, c1 or c2 is either
spent in r2 or r3 (although detailed matches are unknown), and c3
must be the spent coin in r1. Besides, r4 has 3 useless mixins (i.e.,
c1, c2, c3), which increases r4’s transaction fee.
As the second weakness of the current RS scheme, it does not
consider the impact of the diversity of mixins [20]. The diversity of
a RS’s mixins is measured by the number of historical transactions
outputting them. When the diversity of mixins is low, the RS’s
effectiveness is low. In Example 1, if c5 ∼ c7 are outputted by the
same historical transaction t (c5 ∼ c7 were spent in t) and c4 is the
spent coin in r4, then the owner of the historical transaction t, who
is not the user that spends coin c4, can deduce that c4 is the spent
coin in r4 (as c1 ∼ c3 and c5 ∼ c7 are already detected).
To avoid the “chain-reaction” analysis, we need to consider the
related RSs’ impact and make RSs produce observations with “sim-
ilar” distribution for any two coins. To overcome the second defect,
we need to find a mixin set with high diversity. Since the transac-
tion fee is proportional to the number of mixins, the users usually
want to restrain the number of mixins within limited budget. Thus,
we need to pick a set of mixins with high diversity and effectively
resist “chain-reaction” analysis based attacks under the constraint
of the budget. To tackle this problem, two challenges need to be
addressed: (1) for any two coins, how to measure the “similarity
level” of the observations; and (2) how to pick a desired set of mix-
ins to maximize their diversity under the constraint of budget.
In this paper, we propose a novel differential privacy concept,
namely -coin-indistinguishability (-CI) to measure a RS’s effec-
tiveness. A RS’s sender has -privacy if any two coins in the RS can
produce observations with “similar” distributions, where the “level
of similarity” depends on . The smaller  is, the higher the privacy
is. In the sequel, we illustrate the problem in a motivation example.
Example 2 (The Coin-Indistinguishability-Aware Mixins Selection
Problem). Suppose there are four coins (c1, c2, c3, c4) and two
RSs, r1 = {c1, c2} and r2 = {c1, c3}. The spent coins in RSs
are underlined. Among four coins, c1 and c4 are the same histori-
cal transaction’s outputs while c2 and c3 are outputs of another two
historical transactions. The budget is 3. Assume the required CI is
very relaxed and only requires that the spent coin in a RS cannot be
inferred. Now we want to generate a RS to spend c3. As shown in
Figure 2, the permutation of possible spent coins under given RSs
can be presented with a permutation tree, where the nodes in each
level indicate the possible spent coins for the corresponding RSs.
The first solution is using RS τ1 = {c1, c3}. As shown in Fig.
2(a), although τ1 cannot be inferred, it makes witnesses easily de-
duce that c2 is the spent coin in r1. For simplify, in the rest of this
paper, we will only present the valid possible nodes of the permu-
tation tree and ignore the corresponding RSs.
The second solution is using RS τ2 = {c1, c3, c4}. As shown
in Fig. 2(b), the CIs of τ2, r1, and r2 are preserved. However, its
diversity is not large. Since c1 and c4 are the outputs of the same
historical transaction, τ3’s diversity is only 2.
The third solution is using RS τ3 = {c1, c2, c3, c4}. As shown
in Fig. 2(c), the CIs of τ3, r1, and r2 are preserved. Its diversity is
large, which is 3. However, τ3 does not meet the budget constraint,
since its cardinality is 4, which is larger than the budget.
A good solution is using RS τ4 = {c2, c3, c4}. As shown in Fig.
2(d), the CIs of τ4, r1, and r2 are preserved. Besides, its diversity
is large and it meets the budget constraint.
In this paper, we first formally define the coin-indistinguishability-
aware mixins selection with disjoint-superset constraint (CIA-MS-
DS) problem, which aims to find a mixin set that meets the required
CI constraint, as well as the budget constraint, and has a maximal
diversity. Moreover, each RS is either disjoint with or the superset
of its preceding RSs. We prove the CIA-MS-DS problem is NP-
hard through a reduction from the 01-knapsack problem [21] and
we propose two approximation algorithms with theoretic guaran-
tees. The Progressive Algorithm gradually narrows down the can-
didate mixin set one constraint by one constraint. The Game theo-
retic Algorithm models the problem as a game and let each mixin
computes the right to be selected in the new RS.
To our knowledge, this is the first study to apply differential-
privacy schemes on Blockchain systems and formally estimate a
RS’s effectiveness. Our work provides new insights into how to
pick mixins in RS schemes. Specifically, we make the following
contributions:
• We define the notion of -coin-indistinguishability by applying
differential-privacy schemes on Blockchain systems in Section2.
• We formally define the coin-indistinguishability-aware mixins
selection with disjoint-superset constraint (CIA-MS-DS) prob-
lem and give the proof of its hardness in Section 3.
• We propose two approximation algorithms, the Progressive Al-
gorithm and the Game Theoretic Algorithm, with theoretic guar-
antees for the CIA-MS-DS problem in Section 5 and Section 6
respectively.
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• We conduct extensive experiments on both real and synthetic
data sets and show efficiency as well as the effectiveness of our
proposed solutions in Section 7.
Besides, we propose a framework, CoinMagic, in Section 4, dis-
cuss the related work in Section 8 and conclude in Section 9.
2. COIN-INDISTINGUISHABILITY
In this section, we formalize the concept of coin-indistinguishability.
As aforementioned, coin-indistinguishability is utilized to guaran-
tee that it is hard to distinguish the spent coin in a RS. Our proposal
is based on a generalization of differential privacy [22]. Our notion
and technique abstract from the side information of the adversary,
such as prior probabilistic knowledge about a RS’s mixins. The
advantages of the independence from the prior are that: first, the
mechanism is designed for any prior probabilistic. Second, and
even more important, it is also applicable when we do not have the
information of the prior probabilistic of mixins [10]. Because RSs
can hide the spent coins, we even do not know whether the selected
mixins have been spent or not.
2.1 The Related RS Set and Mixin Universe
As shown in Example 2, a RS’s effectiveness is impacted by
some related RSs. We first formally define the mixin universe and
the related RS set. Suppose cτ is the coin that a user wants to spend
in a new RS.
Definition 1. (Mixin Universe) The mixin universe Cn = {c1, c2,
· · · , cn} is a set of coins that can be picked up as mixins in a new
RS. A coin ci is the output of a transaction ti.
In blockchain systems, each coin is a transaction’s output. In a
transaction, there may be more than one output. In Example 2, the
mixin universe is C = {c1, c2, · · · , c4}.
Definition 2. (Related Ring Signature Set) For a RS rf = Cx ∪
{cτ}, the related RS set Rf = {r1, r2, · · · , rm} is a set of RSs
with earlier spending timestamps than rf which contain the coin cτ
or any coins in Cx.
For instance, in Example 2, the related RS set is {r1, r2}. Since
RSs in Rf may contain common coins with the new RS rf , they
may impact the effectiveness of rf on privacy reserving. For a set
of RSs Rf , let If (ri) indicate the position of RS ri in the ascend-
ingly ordered list of RSs in Rf sorted according to their spending
timestamps.
2.2 Probabilistic Model of MIXINS
Since we do not know whether the mixins are spent or not, we
introduce a probabilistic model here. Probabilities come into place
in two ways. First, the adversary may have side information about
the coins’ expense, (e.g., knowing that some coins contained in a
RS are not the spent coins since the adversary is the owner of these
coins [20]). The adversary’s side information can be modeled by a
prior distribution pi(c, r) indicating the probability of coin c being
spent in RS r. Second, RS r spending coin c is also a probabilistic
event. Since the spent coin is obscured by mixins, any coin in the
RS r is likely to be the spent coin.
Since RSs may not be disjoint and each coin can only be spent
in a RS, given a set of RSs, there may be more than one possible
spent coin permutation over the given RS set. Here, we formally
define a spent coin permutation as follow.
Definition 3 (Spent Coin Permutation). Given a related RS set,
Rf = {r1, r2, · · · , rm}, a spent coin permutation P is an ordered
list of coins [sc1, sc2, · · · , scm], where sci is a spent coin of a RS
rj ∈ Rf whose If (j) is i and ∀sch, scg ∈ P, sch 6= scg .
(a) T2 (b) T3
Figure 3: Example 3.
As shown in Fig. 2, we represent these permutations by a tree
structure for easier understanding.
Definition 4 (Spent Coin Permutation Tree). Given a related RS
set, Rf = {r1, r2, · · · , rm}, we can generate a spent coin per-
mutation tree Tf . Except for the root node, each node in Tf is
presented by κ = 〈dκ,Pκ, scκ〉, where dκ is the node’s depth in
Tf (root’s depth is 0), Pκ is a spent coin permutation [scκ1 , scκ2 ,
· · · , scκdκ−1], where each scκi is the spent coin of a RS rj ∈ Rf
whose If (j) = i, and scκ is the spent coin in this node (i.e.,
scκ = sc
κ
dκ ). For node κ, scκ /∈ Pκ. For any two nodes, κ and κ′,
Pκ∪scκ 6= Pκ′ ∪scκ′ , and if Pκ′ = Pκ∪scκ, κ is the father node
of κ′.
We can estimate the probability of each coin-and-signature pair
by constructing its spent coin permutation tree. We denote Ni,j as
the set of nodes in Ti whose depth is Ii(j). Let Nk,ti,j be the set of
nodes in Ti whose depth is Ii(j) and kth element in Pκ is coin ct.
We can calculate the probability of coin ct being spent in the RS
rk when the permutation tree is Ti by:
Pri(ct, rk) =
|Nk,ti,i |
|Ni,i| (1)
Thus, the probability of ct having been spent in Ri can be calcu-
lated as:
Pri(ct) =
∑i
k=1 |Nk,ti,i |
|Ni,i| (2)
Example 3. There are three RSs, r1 = {c1, c2}, r2 = {c1, c2, c3},
r3 = {c1, c2, c3, c4}. The Figure 3(a) shows the permutation tree
T2 and Figure 3(b) shows the permutation tree T3. Then, |N2,2| =
4, |N3,3| = 8, |N2,32,2| = 2, Pr2(c3, r2) = 12 , and Pr3(c3, r2) = 12 .
2.3 Coin-Indistinguishability
We propose a formal definition of the coin-indistingushability to
restrict the information leakage from observations. In other words,
any adversary cannot obtain extra information from RSs w.r.t. the
pre-defined privacy reserving level.
Definition 5. (-Coin-Indistinguishability (-CI)) Given a related
RS set, Rf = {r1, r2, · · · , rm}, a RS rk ∈ Rf satisfies -coin-
indistinguishability (-CI) if for any two coins ci, cj which are both
contained in the RS rk (i.e., ci, cj ∈ rk):
Prf (rk|ci) ≤ e · Prf (rk|cj)
Prf (rk|ci) = Prf (rk,ci)Prf (ci) is the probability that when ci is spent,
it is spent in rk. For instance, in Example 3, r3 satisfies ln 83 -CI. If
rk satisfies -CI, for any ¯ ≥ , rk also satisfy ¯-CI.
2.4 Bounded Information Leakage
We prove a characterization that quantifies over all priors to ex-
plain how the prior affects the privacy guarantees.
Theorem 2.1. An upper bound of the posterior distribution of coin
ci being spent in a RS rk ∈ Rf which satisfies -CI can be ob-
tained by Prf (ci|rk) ≤ e · pi(ci,rk)∑
cj∈rk pi(cj ,rk)
, where pi(ci, rk) is
the prior distribution modeled by the adversary’s side information,
indicating the probability of coin ci being spent in the RS rk.
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Proof. We can calculate the posterior distribution of coin ci being
spent in rk by Prf (ci|rk) = pi(ci,rk)·Prf (rk|ci)∑
cj∈rk pi(cj ,rk)·Prf (rk|cj)
. Since rk
satisfies -CI, we have Prf (ci|rk) = pi(ci,rk)·Prf (rk|ci)∑
cj∈rk pi(cj ,rk)·Prf (rk|cj)
≤ pi(ci,rk)
e−
∑
cj∈rk pi(cj ,rk)
= e · pi(ci,rk)∑
cj∈rk pi(cj ,rk)
.
The upper bound of posterior probability implies that no mat-
ter what prior information the adversary has, -CI constrains the
multiplicative distance between the posterior distribution and prior
distribution within e, and thus limits the posterior information gain
of the adversary.
3. PROBLEM DEFINITION
In this section, we first formally introduce some notions and then
formulate the CI-aware mixins selection problem with disjoint-superset
constraint (CIA-MS-DS). Besides, we give the proof of properties
of the CIA-MS-DS problem, which can help to solve the prob-
lem more efficiently. Furthermore, we give the proof of the NP-
hardness of the CIA-MS-DS problem.
3.1 Preliminaries
We first define the -CI-keeping RS as follow:
Definition 6. (A -CI-Keeping Ring Signature (-CIK-RS)) Given
a related RS setRf , a RS rf is a -CI-keeping RS if ∀i ≤ f,∀c, c′ ∈
ri, P rf (ri|c) ≤ Prf (ri|c′) · e.
As aforementioned, subsequent RSs have impacts on the effec-
tiveness of the previous RSs. To preserve the effectiveness existing
RSs, a new RS should be a -CIK-RS.
When each RS ri in a related RS set Rf is disjoint with any RS
rj in Ri which is not the subset of ri, the related RS set Rf is a
disjoint-superset related RS set. It is practical for the real world
applications since it does not divulge the users’ privacy. Besides, it
is helpful for calculating the conditional probabilities Prf (rk|ci)
for calculating the level of CI. We will introduce and give the proof
os some properties of a disjoint-superset related RS set shortly in
Subsection 3.3.
Definition 7. (Disjoint-Superset Related Ring Signature Set). For
a related RS set, Rf , it is a disjoint-superset related RS set if for
any two RSs, they are disjoint or one RS is the superset of another
RS.
For instance, in Example 3 {r1, r2, r3} is a disjoint-superset re-
lated ring signature set. However, in Example 2 {r1, r2} is not a
disjoint-superset related ring signature set, since r1 ∩ r2 = c1.
By Definition 7, given a disjoint-superset RS set Rf , there are
some special RSs in Rf , namely super ring signature, whose sub-
sequent RSs are all disjoint with it. We formally define this kind of
RSs as follows.
Definition 8. (Super Ring Signature) Given a related RS set Rf ,
a RS ri ∈ Rf is a super RS if for any rj ∈ Rf whose If (ri) <
If (rj), ri * rj .
By Definition 7, if a RS ri is a super RS, ∀If (j) ≥ If (i), ri ∩
rj = ∅. For example, there are four RSs, r1 = {c1, c2}, r2 =
{c1, c2, c3}, r3 = {c1, c2, c3}, and r4 = {c4, c5}. Assume r4
is the RS whose timestamp is the latest and I4(r1) < I4(r2) <
I4(r3) < I4(r4). Then, r3 and r4 are super RSs. Since I4(r1) <
I4(r3) and r1 ⊂ r3, r1 is not a super RS. Similarly, r2 is also not a
super RS.
To more easily propose the problem and discuss its properties,
we introduce some notations here. Given a related RS set Rf ,
we denote SRSf as the set of super RS, SRSf = {srs1, srs2,
· · · , srsn}. For each super RS, srsi, we define its diversity, divei,
as the number of historical transactions outputting the coins in srsi.
We denote nsi as the number of RSs in the related RS setRf which
are subsets of srsi. We denote the degree di of srsi as the number
of coins in srsi minus nsi (i.e., di = |srsi| − nsi). Besides, we
define the maximal coin spent probability, primax, of srsi as the
maximal value of the probability that a coin in srsi has been spent
in the related RS set Rf , i.e., primax = max{Prf (c)|c ∈ srsi},
where Prf (c) is defined as the probability that the coin c having
been spent in Rf in Equation 2. Similarly, we define the minimal
coin spent probability, primin, of srsi as the minimal value of the
probability that a coin in srsi has been spent in the related RS set
Rf , i.e., primax = min{Prf (c)|c ∈ srsi}.
Among the mixin universe, there may be some coins that are not
contained in any RSs. In Example 2, when we try to generate a RS
to spend c3, c4 has not been contained in any RSs.
Definition 9. (Fresh Coin Set) Given a related RS, R, and a mixin
universe C, a fresh coin set F = {fc1, fc2, · · · , fcn} is a set of
coins in C that have not been contained in any RSs in R.
3.2 The CI-aware Mixins Selection with Disjoint-
superset Constraint Problem
In this subsection, we formally define the CIA-MS-DS problem.
Definition 10. (The CI-aware mixins selection with disjoint-superset
constraint (CIA-MS-DS) problem) Given a super RS set SRS, a
fresh coin set F, the coin cτ that will be spent, a required , and a
budget B, a user wants to pick up a set of mixins, combining cτ , to
generate the new RS rτ , such that its diversity diverτ = |{ti|ci ∈
rτ}| is maximized and the following constraints are satisfied:
• DS constraint rτ is composed of some super RSs in SRS and
some fresh coins in F;
• Budget constraint the number of coins in rτ does not exceed
the budget; and
• -CIK constraint rτ is a -CIK-RS.
Since the transaction fee of a RS is proportional to the num-
ber of coins in it, to limit the transaction fee of the new RS rτ ,
the number of coins in rτ should meet the budget constraint, i.e.,
|{c|c ∈ rτ}| ≤ B. Besides, since the new RS rτ should protect
effectiveness of the existing RSs, it should be a -CIK-RS. Besides,
when the new RS rτ is composed of some super RSs in SRS and
some fresh coins in F, rτ is disjoint with any RS in Rf which is not
the subset of rτ . This can help to quickly verify if the new RS rτ is
a -CIK-RS by the properties of the CIA-MS-DS problem, which
will be introduced shortly in the next subsection. In addition, it can
help other users to quickly generate the new RSs, which makes the
problem practical for real world applications.
3.3 Properties of the CIA-MS-DS Problem
When a related RS set is a disjoint-superset related RS set, there
are some important properties, which can help to calculate the at-
tributes of each super RS (Theorem 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3) and reduce
the time complexity of verifying whether the generated RS rτ is a
-CIK-RS (Theorem 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6).
We first prove in Theorem 3.1 that when a related RS set is
a disjoint-superset related RS set, the probability of coin c being
spent in the RS r will keep stable.
Theorem 3.1. Given a disjoint-superset related RS set, Rf =
{r1, r2, · · · , rm}, ∀If (i) ∈ [2,m], ∀If (j) < If (i), ∀ct ∈ rj ,
we have Pri(rj , ct) =Prh(rj , ct), where If (h) = If (i)− 1.
Proof. By Definition 4 and 7, ∀i ∈ [1,m], for each node κ in
Ni,i, we can partition Pκ as two sets P1κ and P2κ, where P1κ ⊆ ri,
P2κ∩ ri = ∅, and P1κ∪P2κ = Pκ. Thus, |P1κ| = nsi. Since each RS
spents an unspent coin, ∀i ∈ [1,m], |ri| > nsi. Thus, by Defini-
tion 4, ∀If (i) ∈ [2,m], Ni,i = Ni,h and for each node κ ∈ Ni,h,
it has di children. Thus, ∀If (i) ∈ [2,m], ∀If (j) < If (i), ∀ct ∈
4
rj ,Nj,ti,h = N
j,t
h,h.Thus, by Equation 1, ∀If (i) ∈ [2,m], ∀If (j)
< If (i), ∀c ∈ rj , Pri(rj , ct) = |N
j,t
i,i |
|Ni,i| =
|Nj,t
i,h
|·di
|Ni,h|·di =
|Nj,t
i,h
|
|Ni,h| =
Prh(rj , ct).
Next, we prove in Theorem 3.2 that when a related RS set is a
disjoint-superset related RS set, the probability of a coin ct being
spent in the latest RS can be calculated iteratively.
Theorem 3.2. Given a disjoint-superset related RS setRf = {r1, r2,
· · · , rm}, ∀ct ∈ rf , we have Prf (rf , ct) = 1−Prh(ct)df , where
If (h) = If (f)− 1.
Proof. As proved in Theorem 3.1, each node in Nf,h has df chil-
dren and ∀ck ∈ rh,Nh,kf,h = Nh,kh,h. Therefore, according to Equa-
tion 1, ∀ct ∈ rf , we havePrf (rf , ct) = |N
f,t
f,f
|
|Nf,f | =
|Nf,h|−
∑h
j=1 |Nj,tf,h|
|Nf,h|·df
=
|Nf,h|
|Nf,h|
−
∑h
j=1 |N
j,t
f,h
|
|Nf,h|
df
= 1−Prh(ct)
df
.
Then, we show that when a related RS set is a disjoint-superset
related RS set, the probability of a coin c having been spent in Rf
can be calculated iteratively.
Theorem 3.3. Given a disjoint-superset related RS set, Rf = {r1, r2,
· · · , rm}, ∀i ∈ [1,m], ∀c, Pri(c) =
{
Prj(c) c /∈ ri
Prj(c) +
1−Prj(c)
di
c ∈ ri
,
where If (j) = If (i)− 1, If (g) = 0, and Prg(c) = 0.
Proof. As proved, ∀i ∈ [2,m],∀h < i, ∀ct ∈ rh, Nh,ti,j = Nh,tj,j
and each node in Ni,j has di children. Thus, ∀i ∈ [2,m],∀ct ∈ ri,
Pri(ct) =
∑i
h=1 |Nh,ti,i |
|Ni,i| =
(|Ni,j |−
∑j
h=1
|Nh,ti,j |)+di·
∑j
h=1
|Nh,ti,j |
|Ni,j |·di =∑j
h=1
|Nh,ti,j |
|Ni,j | +
1−
∑j
h=1
|Nh,t
i,j
|
|Ni,j |
di
= Prj(ct)+
1−Prj(ct)
di
. Let If (k) =
1. By Equation 2, ∀c ∈ rk, Prk(c) = 1|rk| = Prg(c) +
1−Prg(c)
dk
. Simi-
larly, we can prove ∀i ∈ [1,m], ∀c /∈ ri, P ri(c) = Prj(c).
Thus, given a disjoint-superset related RS set, Rf , we can easily
calculate the attributes of each super RS. Then, for any two coins
c, c′ in the same RS ri, we proved that if the probability of c being
spent is smaller than the probability of c′ being spent in Ri, the
probability of c being spent must be smaller than the probability of
c′ being spent in any Rj , where If (j) ≥ If (i).
Theorem 3.4. Given a disjoint-superset related RS set, Rf =
{r1, r2, · · · , rm}, ∀i ∈ [1,m], ∀If (j) ≤ If (i), ∀c, c′ ∈ rj , if
Prj(c) ≤ Prj(c′), it holds that Pri(c) ≤ Pri(c′).
Proof. By Definition 7, ∀i ∈ [1,m], ∀If (j) ≤ If (i), ∀c, c′ ∈ rj ,
if c ∈ ri, c′ ∈ ri. Suppose If (j) = If (i) − 1. Thus, Pri(c) −
Pri(c
′) = Prj(c)+
1−Prj(c)
di
−Prj(c′)− 1−Prj(c
′)
di
= [Prj(c)−
Prj(c
′)] − 1
di
· [Prj(c) − Prj(c′)]. Since di ≥ 1 and Prj(c) ≤
Prj(c
′), Pri(c)− Pri(c′) ≤ 0.
Besides, given a disjoint-superset related RS set Rf , for any two
coins c, c′ in the same RS rj , we proved that if the conditional
probability Pri(rj |c) is smaller than Pri(rj |c′), we can find for
any ∀If (k) ∈ [If (j)− 1, If (i)], the probability of c being spent is
larger than the probability of c′ being spent.
Theorem 3.5. Given a disjoint-superset related RS set, Rf =
{r1, r2, · · · , rm}, ∀i ∈ [1,m], ∀If (j) ≤ If (i), ∀c, c′ ∈ rj ,
if Pri(rj |c) ≤ Pri(rj |c′), ∀If (k) ∈ [If (g), If (i)], P rk(c) ≥
Prk(c
′), where If (g) = If (j)− 1.
Proof. DenoteF (t, j, i) as a function to recursively calculatePri(ct)
from Prj(ct). As proved in Theorem 3.4, F (t, j, i) increases when
Prj(ct) increases. By Definition 7, ∀i ∈ [1,m],∀If (j) ≤ If (h),
∀c, c′ ∈ rj , if c ∈ ri, c′ ∈ ri. By Theorem 3.1 and 3.3,
∀i ∈ [1,m], ∀If (j) ≤ If (i), ∀ct ∈ rj , Pri(rj |ct) = Pri(rj ,ct)Pri(ct) =
Prj(rj ,ct)
F (t,j,i)
=
1−Prg(ct)
dj
F (t,g,i)
. Thus, Pri(rj |ct) increases when Prg(ct)
decreases. Thus, ∀i ∈ [1,m], ∀If (j) ≤ If (i), ∀c, c′ ∈ rj , if
Pri(rj |c) ≤ Pri(rj |c′), Prg(c) ≥ Prg(c′). Then by Theo-
rem 3.4, we have ∀i ∈ [1,m],∀If (j) ≤ If (i), ∀c, c′ ∈ rj , ∀If (k) ∈
[If (g), If (i)], P rk(c) ≥ Prk(c′).
Then we prove that, if the conditional probabilities Pri(rj |ct)
of two coins in a RS satisfy -CI, the conditional probabilities of
these two coins in the RS after adding some RSs also satisfy -CI.
Theorem 3.6. Given a disjoint-superset related RS set, Rf =
{r1, r2, · · · , rm}, ∀i ∈ [1,m],∀If (j) ≤ If (i), ∀c, c′ ∈ rj , if
Pri(rj |c) ≥ Pri(rj |c′) and Pri(rj |c)Pri(rj |c′) = β, ∀k ∈ [If (i),m],
Prk(rj |c) ≥ Prk(rj |c′) and Prk(rj |c)Prk(rj |c′) = β
′ ≤ β.
Proof. By Theorem 3.5, if Pri(rj |c) ≥ Pri(rj |c′), Pri(c) ≤
Pri(c
′). Suppose rk is the RS with the lowest If (k) where If (k) ≥
If (i) and ri ⊆ rk. By Theorem 3.4, Prk(c) ≤ Pri(c′) and
Prk(rj |c) ≥ Prk(rj |c′). Then, by Theorem 3.1 and 3.3, β′ =
Prk(rj |c)
Prk(rj |c′) =
Pri(rj ,c)
Pri(c)+
1−Pri(c)
di
· Pri(c
′)+ 1−Pri(c
′)
di
Pri(rj ,c′) =
Pri(rj ,c)
Pri(rj ,c′) ·
(di−1)Pri(c′)+1
(di−1)Pri(c)+1 . When di− 1 ≥ 1, β
′ ≤ Pri(rj ,c)
Pri(rj ,c′) ·
Pri(c
′)
Pri(c)
= β.
When di−1 = 0, β′ = Pri(rj ,c)Pri(rj ,c′) ≤
Pri(rj ,c)
Pri(rj ,c′) ·
Pri(c
′)
Pri(c)
= β. Sim-
ilarly, we can prove ∀k ∈ [If (i),m] ∧ ri * rk, it still holds.
Suppose the corresponding disjoint-superset related RS set of the
given super RS set SRS is Rτ . Thus, if the new RS rτ is com-
posed of some super RSs in SRS and some fresh coins in F, by
Definition 8, rτ is a super RS in Rτ ∪ rτ . Then by Theorem 3.6,
since RSs in SRS all satisfy the -CI, if rτ satisfies -CI, it is a
-CIK-RS. In other words, to verify if rτ is a -CIK-RS, we just
need to verify whether it satisfies -CI, which reduces the time
complexity form O(∑|Rτ |+1i=1 |ri|2) to O(|rτ |2). Besides, suppose
prmax = max{prm(c)|c ∈ rτ} and prmin = min{prm(c)|c ∈
rτ}. Thus, by Definition 5, Theorem 3.3 and Theorem 3.2, to check
rτ satisfies -CI, we just need to verify whether (1−prmax)·e

(dτ−1)·prmax+1 ≥
(1−prmin)
(dτ−1)·prmin+1 , which further reduces the time complexity from
O(|rτ |2) toO(|rτ |), where dτ is the degree of rτ and is calculated
as the number of coins in rτ minus the number of its subsets in Rτ .
3.4 Hardness of the CIA-MS-DS Problem
In this subsection, we prove that the CIA-MS-DS problem is NP-
hard by reducing 0-1 knapsack problem [21].
Theorem 3.7. The CIA-MS-DS problem is NP-hard.
Proof. We prove that the theorem by a reduction from the 0-1 knap-
sack problem [21]: given a set, I , of n items i numbered from 1 up
to n, each with a weight wi and a value xi, along with a maximum
weight capacity C, the 0-1 knapsack problem is to find a subset I ′
of I that maximizes
∑
i∈I′ xi subjected to
∑
cj∈rk wi ≤ C.
For any given 0-1 knapsack problem instance, we can transform
it into a special CIA-MS-DS problem instance in polynomial time
as follows: we generate a super RS set, SRS, where there are n
super RS numbered from 1 up to n, each with a size xi and diver-
sity wi. The fresh coin set is empty. The  is large enough that
any combination of super RSs in SRS is a -CIK-RS. Besides, for
any two coins, the historical transactions which outputs them are
different. Thus, diverτ =
∑
srsi∈rτ divei.
To find the new RS rτ whose diversity is maximum is equal to
find a maximum assignment of 0-1 knapsack problem. Given this
mapping, we can reduce the 0-1 knapsack problem to the CIA-MS-
DS problem. Since the 0-1 knapsack problem is NP-hard [21], the
CIA-MS-DS problem is at least NP-hard.
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Figure 4: The Number of Coins in blocks in Monero blockchain
4. COINMAGIC FRAMEWORK
Since the new RS’s effectiveness on privacy preserving is im-
pacted by the related RSs, before selecting mixins, a user needs
to retrieve the mixin universe C and the related RS set R. The
mixin universe can be retrieved according to the user’s interest or
the blockchain system’s requirement. For instance, in Monero [15],
the system requires that in each RS, half of the mixins should be the
coins which are less than 1.8 days old [23]. However, this method
has two defects. Firstly, since the number of transactions in each
block is unstable (especially, some miners even generate empty
blocks), the cardinality of C is also not constant. For instance, Fig-
ure 4 shows the number of coins in blocks between 2028242 and
2028273 of Monero. Among these blocks, the block 2028252 only
contains 1 coin but the block 2028247 contains 77 coins. Secondly,
the size of the related RS set can unlimitedly increased over time,
which is not efficient for constructing the spent coin permutation
tree and generating new RSs.
In this paper, we propose a framework, namely CoinMagic, to re-
trieve the mixin universeC and related RS setR, then generate new
RSs. Specifically, CoinMagic partitions the blocks in a blockchain
into disjoint and sequential batches, then generates new RSs only
upon the coins and RSs in the same batch. The number of coins in
each batch is bounded in range specified by the system. For each
batch, its mixin universe is consisted of coins in the batch, Thus,
the mixin universes for different batches are disjoint. In addition,
as each RS selects mixins from the mixin universe in its batch, the
related RS sets in different batches are also disjoint. The size of
each related RS set is bounded by the cardinality of the mixin uni-
verse for its batch.
As shown in Algorithm 1, mixin universes are retrieved by batches.
We start at the last block of the last batch before cτ (line 1). Then,
we initialize the mixin universeC and the related RS setR as empty
(line 1). Then we continually read blocks and add the outputs of
transactions in blocks to the mixin universeC until we reach the last
block in the blockchain or the cardinality of C is large enough (line
2-5). Then, we continually read blocks and add the RSs in blocks
which are the subsets of C to R (line 6-10). Since the size of every
block is limited, the number of coins in a block has an upper bound
λ′. Thus, |C| ∈ [λ, λ+ λ′ − 1] and |R| ≤ |C| ≤ λ+ λ′ − 1. This
procedure (line 1 -10) can be accomplished when the user updates
her/his local blockchain status to the global status. In other words,
the user does not need to pay much extra cost for implementing this
framework. Finally, we run a RS generation algorithm to generate
a new RS satisfying the constraints of DS, budget, and -CIK.
Since the mixins of a RS can only be selected within the same
batch, there could be a situation that a user cannot find a RS with -
CI to spend a coin. For example, in Example 2, if the user uses the
RS τ5 = {c1, c2, c3}, then when another user wants to spend c4,
she/he cannot find a RS r with -CI, since witnesses can easily find
that c1, c2, and c3 has been spent in previous three RSs (i.e., r1, r2,
r3) and c4 must be the spent coin in the new RS r. We denote the
Algorithm 1: CoinMagic Framework
Input: the spent coin cτ , blocks in the blockchain system, B,
the threshold, λ, of the number of coins in a batch,
budget, and the system’s required CI level
Output: the new RS
1 set bi as the last block of the last batch before cτ , C = ∅,
R = ∅;
2 while bi is not the last block in B and |C| < λ do
3 bi ← next block;
4 if b is not an empty block then
5 add the output coins of transactions in block b to C;
6 while bi is not the last block in B do
7 bi ← next block;
8 foreach RS r in bi do
9 if r is a subset of C then
10 add r to R;
11 run a RS generation algorithm to generate a new RS satisfying
the constraints of DS, budget and -CIK in Definition 10.
set of fresh coins in a batch as F. To avoid this issue, we require that
at any moment, the F’s cardinality cannot be 1. Next, we formally
prove that if |F| 6= 1, for any cτ and budget, there always exists at
least one RS that satisfies the constraints of DS, budget and -CIK.
Theorem 4.1. If |F| 6= 1, for any cτ and a budget B, there always
exists at least one RS which satisfies the constraints of DS, -CIK,
and budget, where mτ is the module which contains cτ and B ≥
max{|mτ |, 2}.
Proof. Whenmτ is a super RS, according to Theorem 3.6, rm+1 =
mτ is a -CIK-RS and its size satisfies the budget constraint. When
mτ is a fresh coin, since |F| 6= 1, there is at least one fresh coin,
denoted by fc. By Definition 5, rm+1 = mτ ∪fc is also a CIK-RS
and its size satisfies the budget constraint.
5. PROGRESSIVE APPROACH
In this section, to tackle the CIA-MS-DS problem, we propose
an approach, namely the Progressive Algorithm. The main idea of
the approach is that we first use a 0-1 knapsack algorithm to find a
selection which satisfies the -CIK constraint and the DS constraint.
Then we greedily change the selection to make it satisfy the budget
constraint.
5.1 Progressive Algorithm
The algorithm is inspired by the following three lemmas. The
first lemma shows that the degree of the new RS rτ in Rf , denoted
by dτ , is the sum of the degree of each super RS and fresh coin
which is contained in rτ , i.e., dτ =
∑
srsi⊆rτ di +
∑
fci⊆rτ di.
Similar with the definitions of a super RS’s attributes in Subsec-
tion 3.1, we define the attributes of a fresh coin as following. For
each fresh coin, fci, its diversity divei = 1, nsi = 0 and its diver-
sity di = 1, since there is only one fresh coin in fci which is not
contained in any RS in Rf . Besides, since fci is not contained in
any RS in Rf , its Primax = Primin = 0.
Lemma 5.1. For the new RS rτ , its degree dτ is the sum of the
degree of each super RS and fresh coin which is contained in rτ ,
i.e., dτ =
∑
srsi⊆rτ di +
∑
fci⊆rτ di.
Proof. Suppose Subi is the set of RSs in Rf which are the subsets
of srsi and Subτ is the set of RSs inRf which are the subset of rτ .
Thus, dτ = |rτ | − |Subτ | = (∑srsi⊆rτ |srsi| +∑fci⊆rτ 1) −
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Algorithm 2: Progressive Algorithm
Input: A spent coin cτ , a budget B, a super RS set SRS, and a
fresh coin set F
Output: An eligible RS rτ
1 M = SRS ∪ F, rτ = mτ ;
2 for i = 1 to |M | do
3 Mi = M\⋃mk∈M∧Prkmax>Primax mk;
4 for j = 1 to |M | do
5 if mj ∈Mi, Primax ≥ Prτmax and Prjmin ≤ Prτmin then
6 ωi,j = mi ∪mj ∪mτ ;
7 Mi,j =Mi\(ωi,j ∪
⋃
mk∈Mi∧Prkmin<Pr
j
min
mk);
8 update the diversity of each m in Mi,j ;
9 calculate d¯i,j and Oi,jmax;
10 Ci,j = δ-KP(Mi,j , d¯i,j , Oi,jmax);
11 if |Ci,j |+ |ωi,j | > B then
12 ψi,j = ωi,j ;
13 while |ψi,j | ≤ B do
14 greedily add m¯ in Mi,j whose ratio of the
increase of ψi,j’s diveristy to its size is
the largest to ψi,j ;
15 Mi,j = Mi,j\m¯;
16 else
17 ψi,j = ωi,j ∪ Ci,j ;
18 return the ψi,j with maximal diversity as rτ
|Subτ |. By Definition 7, ∀srsi, srsj ∈ SRS, Subi ∩ Subj = ∅.
Besides, ∀srsi ⊆ rτ , ∀r ∈ Subi, r ∈ Subτ , since r ⊆ srsi ⊆ rτ .
Thus,|Subτ | = ∑srsi⊆rτ nsi. Thus, dτ = (∑srsi⊆rτ |srsi| +∑
fci⊆rτ 1)−
∑
srsi⊆rτ nsi = (
∑
srsi⊆rτ |srsi|−
∑
srsi⊆rτ nsi)+∑
fci⊆rτ 1 =
∑
srsi⊆rτ di +
∑
fci⊆rτ di.
As defined in Subsection 3.3, for a RS rτ , Prmax = max{prm(c)|
c ∈ rτ} and Prmin = min{prm(c)|c ∈ rτ}. We will show
that when e · Prmin · (1 − Prmax) − Prmax · (1 − Prmin) ≥
0, the new RS must be a -CIK-RS (which is defined in Defini-
tion 6). Besides, when e · Prmin · (1− Prmax)− Prmax · (1−
Prmin) ≤ 0, if the degree dτ of the new RS rτ is smaller than
(e−1)·(1−Prmax)·(Prmin−1)
e··Prmin·(1−Prmax)−Prmax·(1−Prmin) , the new RS rτ must be a
-CIK-RS.
Lemma 5.2. For a new RS rτ , it is a -CIK-RS, if e ·Prmin · (1−
Prmax) − Prmax · (1 − Prmin) ≥ 0. Besides, it is a -CIK-RS,
if e · Prmin · (1 − Prmax) − Prmax · (1 − Prmin) < 0 and
dτ ≤ (e
−1)·(1−Prmax)·(Prmin−1)
e··Prmin·(1−Prmax)−Prmax·(1−Prmin) .
Proof. As proved in Subsection 3.3, to verify if the new RS rτ is a
-CIK-RS, we just need to verify if (1−prmax)·e

(dτ−1)·prmax+1 ≥
(1−prmin)
(dτ−1)·prmin+1 .
Since (dτ − 1) · Prmax + 1 and (dτ − 1) · Prmin + 1 must
be positive, to verify (1−prmax)·e

(dτ−1)·prmax+1 ≥
(1−prmin)
(dτ−1)·prmin+1 is the
same as to verify e · (1 − Prmax) · [(dτ − 1) · Prmin + 1] ≥
[(dτ − 1) · Prmax + 1] · (1− Prmin).
SupposeX = e ·Prmin ·(1−Prmax)−Prmax ·(1−Prmin)
and Y = (e − 1) · (1 − Prmax) · (Prmin − 1). Thus, to verify
if (1−prmax)·e

(dτ−1)·prmax+1 ≥
(1−prmin)
(dτ−1)·prmin+1 , we just need to verify if
X · dτ ≥ Y . Since e ≥ 1, Prmax ≤ 1 and Prmin ≤ 1, Y ≤ 0.
Thus, if X ≥ 0, it always hold that X · dτ ≥ Y , which means,
rτ is a -CIK-RS. Besides, if X < 0 and dτ ≤ YX , it holds that
X · dτ ≥ YX , which means rτ is a -CIK-RS.
Besides, suppose Omax is the maximal number of coins which
are outputted by the the same historical transaction. We show the
relationship between the diversity of the new RS rτ and the sum-
mation of the diversity of each super RS and fresh coin which is
contained in rτ .
Lemma 5.3. For a new RS rτ , we have
∑
srsi⊆rτ divei+
∑
fci⊆rτ 1
≥ diveτ ≥∑srsi⊆rτ diveiOmax +∑fci⊆rτ 1Omax , where dτ is the
diversity of the new RS rτ .
Proof. In a set of coins, some coins may be outputted by the same
historical transaction. Since Omax is the maximal number of coins
which are outputted by the same historical transaction, it must hold
that diveτ ≥ |rτ |Omax . Since for any super RS srsi its diversity
divei ≤ |srsi|, diveiOmax ≤
|srsi|
Omax
. Therefore, diveτ ≥ |rτ |Omax =∑
srsi⊆rτ |srsi|+
∑
fci⊆rτ 1
Omax
≥∑srsi⊆rτ diveiOmax+∑fci⊆rτ 1Omax .
In addition, denote the set of historical transactions which output
coins in srsi as HTi and the set of historical transactions which
output coins in rτ as HTτ . Since a historical transaction set HTi
may intersect with another historical transaction set HTj on some
historical transactions, |HTi| + |HTj | ≥ |HTi ∪ HTj |. Thus,
dτ = |HTτ | = |⋃srsi⊆rτ HTi ∪⋃fci ti| ≤∑srsi⊆rτ |HTi|+∑
fci⊆rτ 1 =
∑
srsi⊆rτ divei +
∑
fci⊆rτ 1.
Thus, by Lemma 5.1 and Lemma 5.2, we can transform the -
CIK constraint to the constraint of degree. Specifically, we enu-
merate all Prmax-Prmin pairs and for each pair, we calculate the
upper bound of the degree of the new RS, denoted as d¯. We require
the degree of the new RS cannot exceed d¯. Besides, by Lemma 5.3,
we can approximately estimate the diversity of the new RS.
Inspired by aforementioned lemmas, we design the Progressive
Algorithm. Algorithm 2 shows the pseudo-code of our Progressive
Algorithm. By the DS constraint, rτ is composed of some super
RS in SRS or some fresh coins in F. In other words, each super RS
and fresh coin is a candidate module of the new RS rτ . Thus, we
get the module set M by combing SRS and F (line 1). By the DS
constraint, rτ has to containmτ , wheremτ is the module inM that
contains cτ (line 1). Then we enumerate all Prmax-Prmin pairs
(line 2 -17), where mi is the module in the new RS whose Primax
is the maximum andmj is the module in the new RS whose Primin
is the minimum. Thus, for the given Prmax-Prmin pair, ωi,j =
mi ∪mj ∪mτ must be contained in the new RS (line 6). Besides,
the set of candidate modules, which can be selected in the new RS,
isMi,j = M\(⋃Prkmax>Primax mk∪ωi,j∪⋃Prkmin<Prjmin mk)
(line 7). In addition, we update the diversity of each module inMi,j
(line 8). Specifically, the diversity of each module is updated by the
number of transactions outputting the coins in modules, excluding
the transactions outputting the coins in ωi,j . Then, we calculate
the upper bound, d¯i,j , of the degree of the new RS and the Oi,jmax,
which is the maximal number of coins in Mi,j which are outputted
by the same transaction (line 9). Then, we run the δ-KP Algorithm
(line 10), where the item set is Mi,j , the weight of the item mi
is di, the value of the item mi is divei
O
i,j
max
, and the capacity of the
knapsack is d¯i,j . The δ-KP Algorithm is the dynamic programming
algorithm [21] whose precision parameter is δ. The selection Ci,j
from the δ-KP Algorithm may violate the budget constraint. Then,
we greedily select modules in Ci,j to let ψi,j satisfy the budget
constraint (line 11-15). For each module mt in the selection, we
calculate its increase ratio ρt =
diveψ′
i,j
−diveψi,j
|mt| , where ψ
′
i,j =
7
ψi,j∪mt. For each iteration, we add the modulemt with the largest
ρt (14). If the selection Ci,j from the δ-KP Algorithm satisfies the
budget constraint, we set ψi,j = ωi,j ∪ Ci,j (line 16-17). Finally,
we return the ψi,j with the largest diversity as rτ (line 18).
5.2 Theoretic Analyses
We first prove the approximate ratio of the δ-KP Algorithm.
Theorem 5.1. Suppose C∗i,j is the selection of modules in Mi,j
whose degree is smaller than d¯i,j and the number of historical
transactions outputting coins in C∗i,j is the largest. Denote the di-
versity of C∗i,j as dive
∗ and the diversity of Ci,j as diveC . It holds
that diveC
dive∗ ≥ 1−δOmax .
Proof. Denote the value of each module mt in δ-KP as dive#t .
Denote the optimal selection of δ-KP when the input item set is
Mi,j as OPT .
By Lemma 5.3, diveC ≥∑mt∈Ci,j divetOi,jmax = ∑mt∈Ci,j dive#t
and
∑
mt∈C∗i,j dive
#
t =
∑
mt∈C∗i,j
divei
O
i,j
max
≥ dive∗
O
i,j
max
. Therefore,
by [21], diveC ≥∑mt∈Ci,j dive#t ≥ (1−δ) ·∑mt∈OPT dive#t
≥ (1 − δ) · ∑mt∈C∗i,j dive#t ≥ (1 − δ) · dive∗Omax . Therefore,
diveC
dive∗ ≥ 1−δOmax .
Then, based on Theorem 5.1, we give the proof of the approxi-
mate ratio of the Progressive Algorithm.
Theorem 5.2. The approximate ratio of the Progressive Algorithm
is min{ 1−δ
Omax
, Omin
Omax
· B−S+
B
}, where S+ is the maximal size of a
module in M.
Proof. Suppose the RS with maximal diversity is ropt and the RS
generated by the Progressive Algorithm is rp. Suppose mh is the
module whose primax is the highest in the ropt, andms is the mod-
ule whose primin is the smallest in the ropt. Denote the number
of historical transactions which outputs the coins in Ch,s and does
not outputs the coins in ωh,s as diveh,s. Besides, denote the diver-
sity of ropt as diveopt, the diversity of rp as divep, the diversity
of ωh,s as diveωh,s, and the diversity of ψh,s as dive
ψ
h,s. Thus,
divep ≥ diveψh,s.
When |Ch,s|+ |ωi,j | ≤ B, diveψh,s = diveωh,s + divech,s. Sup-
pose OPT ′ is the selection of modules in Mh,s whose degree is
smaller than d¯h,s and the number of historical transactions out-
putting coins in OPT ′ is the largest. We denote the diversity of
OPT ′ as dive′opt. Therefore, diveopt ≤ dive′opt + diveωh,s. As
proved in Theorem 5.1, divep ≥ divech,s ≥ dive′opt · 1−δOi,jmax .
Therefore, divep
diveopt
≥ dive
ω
h,s+dive
c
h,s
diveω
h,s
+dive′opt
≥
diveωh,s+dive
′
opt· 1−δ
O
h,s
max
diveω
h,s
+dive′opt
≥
1−δ
O
h,s
max
≥ 1−δ
Omax
.
When |Ch,s| + |ωi,j | > B, B ≥ |ψh,s| ≥ B − S+. Since
diveψh,a ≥ |ψh,s|Omax , divep ≥ dive
ψ
h,s ≥ B−S
+
Omax
. Since diveopt ≤
|ropt|
Omin
and |ropt| ≤ B, diveopt ≤ BOmin . Therefore,
divep
diveopt
≥
Omin
Omax
· B−S+
B
.
Next, we analyze the time complexity of Progressive Algorithm.
Theorem 5.3. The time complexity of Progressive Algorithm is
O(n5
δ
), where n = |M| = |SRS| + |F| and δ is the precision
parameter of the δ-KP Algorithm.
Proof. There are O(n2) (i, j) pairs and for each pair, the δ-KP
Algorithm cost O(n3
δ
). Thus, the time complexity is O(n5
δ
).
6. GAME THEORETIC APPROACH
Although the Progressive Algorithm can generate a new RS with
a theoretic guaranteed approximate ratio, its time complexity is
high. To solve the CIA-MS-DS problem more efficiently, in this
section, we develop an approach based on the game theory. Specif-
ically, we model the CIA-MS-DS problem as a strategic game,
where each super RS and each fresh coin corresponds to a player:
its goal is to find a strategy that maximizes its own utility. However,
to develop such an approach, there are two challenges need to be
solved: 1) design utility functions of players to let the sum of their
objective is the same as the objective of the CIA-MS-DS problem;
and 2) prove the algorithm can achieve a Nash equilibrium with
guaranteed quality within polynomial time. We solved these two
challenges in the following subsections.
6.1 Game Theoretic Algorithm
In this subsection, we solve the first challenge and design utility
functions of players.
In strategic games [24], players compete with each other to op-
timize their individual objective functions. Under this framework,
each player always tries to choose a strategy that maximizes her/his
own utility without taking the effect of her/his choice on the objec-
tives of other players into consideration. The input of the frame-
work is a strategic game, which can be formally represented by a tu-
ple 〈P, {Sp}p∈P , {Up : ×p∈PSp}p∈P 〉 where P is a set of players
and Sp represents all the possible strategies that a player p can take
during the game to optimize her/his function Up. The optimization
of Up depends on the own strategy of p, as well as the strategies of
other players. In [25], Nash points out that a strategic game has a
pure Nash equilibrium, if there exists a specific choice of strategies
sp ∈ Sp such that the following condition is true for all pi ∈ P :
Ui(s1, · · · , si, · · · , s|P |) ≤ Ui(s1, · · · , s′i, · · · , sP ), ∀s′i ∈ Spi .
Thus, no player has the incentive to deviate from her/his current
strategy. To express the objective functions of all players, [26] pro-
poses a single function Φ : ×p∈PSp, called the potential function
in potential games, which constitutes a special class of strategic
games. Let si denote the set of strategies followed by all players
except pi (i.e., si = {s1, · · · , si−1, si+1, · · · , s|P |}). A potential
game is exact if there exists a potential function Φ, such that for
all si and all possible combinations of si Ui(si, si)−Ui(s′i, si) =
Φ(si, si)−Φ(s′i, si). In [26], it is proved that for potential games,
the framework always converges to a pure Nash equilibrium.
We model our problem as a game. Each player has two strate-
gies, s1 and s0, which are being selected and not being selected
in the new RS, respectively. Given si and si, if rτ is eligible, the
utility of pi is Ui(si, si) = |{ti|ci∈rτ}||P | , otherwise Ui(si, si) = 0.
Thus, the objective function of the CIA-MS-DS problem is equal
to the summation of the utility of each individual player. The goal
of each player is to find the strategy that maximizes its own utility.
This decomposition of the objective of the CIA-MS-DS problem
into the summation of individual utility functions provides a natu-
ral motivation for modeling the CIA-MS-DS problem as a game.
Further, we define the potential function as
Φ(S) =
{ |{ti|ci∈rτ}|
|P | , rτ is eligible
0 otherwise
Algorithm 3 shows the pseudo-code of our Game Theoretic Al-
gorithm. By the DS constraint, rτ is composed of some super
RS in SRS or some fresh coins in F. In other words, each su-
per RS and fresh coin is a candidate module of the new RS rτ .
Thus, we get the module set M by combing SRS and F (line 1).
Besides, by the DS constraint, rτ has to contain the module mτ
8
Algorithm 3: Game Theoretic Algorithm
Input: A spent coin cτ , a budget B, a super RS set SRS, and a
fresh coin set F
Output: An eligible RS rτ
1 M = SRS ∪ F, rτ = mτ ;
2 for i = 1 to |M | do
3 Pi = M\⋃mk∈M∧Prkmax>Primax mk;
4 for j = 1 to |M | do
5 if mj ∈ Pi, Primax ≥ Prτmax and Prjmin ≤ Prτmin then
6 ωi,j = mi ∪mj ∪mτ ;
7 Pi,j = Pi\(ωi,j ∪
⋃
mk∈Pi∧Prkmin<Pr
j
min
mk);
8 initialize the strategy of each player;
9 repeat
10 foreach play p ∈ Pi,j do
11 si = s
0;
12 if the utility of s1 is higher then
13 si = s
1;
14 until reaching an Nash equilibrium
15 get ψi,j by strategies of players, combining ωi,j ;
16 return the ψi,j with maximal diversity as rτ
which contains cτ (line 1). Then we enumerate all Prmax-Prmin
pairs (line 2 -15), where mi is the module in the new RS whose
Primax is the maximum and mj is the module in the new RS
whose Primin is the minimum. Thus, for the given Prmax-Prmin
pair, ωi,j = mi ∪ mj ∪ mτ must be contained in the new RS
(line 6). Besides, for each Prmax-Prmin pair, the player set is
Pi,j = M\(⋃Prkmax>Primax mk ∪ ωi,j ∪ ⋃Prkmin<Prjmin mk)
(line 7). For each player, we randomly assign a strategy (line 8).
Next, the algorithm starts the best-response procedure (line 9-14).
In each iteration, for each player p, it selects the strategy with the
highest utility. When the two utilities are the same, it selects s0
(line 10-13). When reaching the Nash equilibrium, by strategies
of players, we get a candidate RS ψi,j (line 15). Since rτ = mτ
satisfies the required constraints and when rτ is eligible, the utility
of each player is higher, there is at least one eligible RS ψi,j .
6.2 Theoretic Analyses
In this subsection, we solve the second challenge and prove the
algorithm can achieve a Nash equilibrium with guaranteed quality
within polynomial time.
We first prove that for each Prmax-Prmin pair, our game is an
exact potential game.
Theorem 6.1. For each Prmax-Prmin pair, the game in the best-
response procedure is an exact potential game.
Proof. We denote a Prmax-Prmin pair by (i, j), where Prmax =
Primax and Prmin = Pr
j
min. For any (i, j) pair, we first proving
Uk(sk, sk)− Uk(s′k, sk) = Φ(sk, sk)− Φ(s′k, sk).
Suppose ri,jτ,1 is the RS which is generated by the strategies sk
and sk, combining ωi,j . Suppose ri,jτ,2 is the RS which is generated
by the strategies sk and s′k, combining ωi,j .
When ri,jτ,1 is eligible and r
i,j
τ,2 is not eligible, Uk(sk, sk) =
Φ(sk, sk) =
|{th|ch∈ri,jτ,1}|
|Pi,j | and Uk(s
′
k, sk) = Φ(s
′
k, sk) = 0.
Thus,Uk(sk, sk)−Uk(s′k, sk) =
|{th|ch∈ri,jτ,1}|
|Pi,j | −0 = Φ(sk, sk)−
Φ(s′k, sk).
When ri,jτ,1 is eligible and r
i,j
τ,2 is eligible,Uk(sk, sk) = Φ(sk, sk)
=
|{th|ch∈ri,jτ,1}|
|Pi,j | and Uk(s
′
k, sk) = Φ(s
′
k, sk) =
|{th|ch∈ri,jτ,2}|
|Pi,j | .
Thus,Uk(sk, sk)−Uk(s′k, sk) =
|{th|ch∈ri,jτ,1}|
|Pi,j | −
|{th|ch∈ri,jτ,2}|
|Pi,j | =
Φ(sk, sk)− Φ(s′k, sk).
When ri,jτ,1 and r
i,j
τ,1 are not eligible, Uk(sk, sk) = Φ(sk, sk) =
0 andUk(s′k, sk) = Φ(s
′
k, sk) = 0. Thus,Uk(sk, sk)−Uk(s′k, sk) =
0− 0 = Φ(sk, sk)− Φ(s′k, sk).
When ri,jτ,1 is not eligible and r
i,j
τ,1 is eligible, Uk(sk, sk) =
Φ(sk, sk) = 0 and Uk(s′k, sk) = Φ(s
′
k, sk) =
|{th|ch∈ri,jτ,1}|
|Pi,j | .
Thus,Uk(sk, sk)−Uk(s′k, sk) = 0−
|{th|ch∈ri,jτ,1}|
|Pi,j | = Φ(sk, sk)−
Φ(s′k, sk).
Then, for any (i, j) pair, by [26], sinceUk(sk, sk)−Uk(s′k, sk) =
Φ(sk, sk)−Φ(s′k, sk), the game in the best-response procedure is
an exact potential game.
Since the game in each best-response procedure is an exact po-
tential game, and the set of strategic configurations S is finite, by
[26], a Nash equilibrium can be reached after players changing their
strategies a finite number of times. For simplicity, we prove the
upper bound for the number of rounds required to reach the con-
vergence of Game Theoretic Algorithm by a scaled version of the
problem where the objective function takes integer values. We as-
sume an equivalent game with potential function ΦZ(S) = d·Φ(S)
such that ΦZ(S) ∈ Z,∀S, whcih does not scale with the size of the
problem. Then, we can prove the following lemma.
Lemma 6.1. The number of rounds required by each best-response
procedure to converge to an equilibrium is O(d · n), where n =
|M| = |SRS|+ |F|.
Proof. The scaled version of the Game Algorithm with the poten-
tial function ΦZ(S) = d·Φ(S) will converge to a Nash equilibrium
in the same number of rounds as the Game algorithm. Since the
change of ΦZ(S) is at least 1, and 0 ≤ ΦZ(S) ≤ n, the number of
rounds is at most d·n−0
1
= d · n.
Then, we give the proof of the time complexity of the Game
Theoretic Algorithm as follows.
Lemma 6.2. The time complexity of the Game Theoretic Algorithm
is O(d · n4), where n = |M| = |SRS|+ |F|.
Proof. There areO(n2) Prmax-Prmin pairs and for each pair, the
best-response procedure requiresO(d·n) rounds iteration. Further-
more, in each iteration of the best-response procedure (line 9 - 14),
there are O(n) players. Thus, the time complexity of the Game
Theoretic Algorithm is O(d · n4).
After proving Game Theoretic Algorithm can converge within
polynomial time, we discuss how good the resulting solution is.
Usually, researchers use social optimum (OPT), price of stabil-
ity(PoS), and price of anarchy(PoA) to evaluate the quality of an
equilibrium. TheOPT is the solution that yields the optimal values
to all the objective functions, so that their total utility is maximum.
The PoS of a game is the ratio between the best value among its
equilibriums and the OPT. The PoA of a game is the ratio between
the worst value among its equilibriums and the OPT.
Theorem 6.2. The PoS is bounded by 1
n
and the PoA is bounded
by Omin·diveτ
B
, where n = |M| = |SRS|+ |F|, Omin is the mini-
mal number of coins which are outputted by the same transaction,
and diveτ is the diversity of the module which contains cτ .
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Table 1: Experimental Settings (Real).
Parameters Values
the budget B 40, 60, 80, 100, 120
the CI level  1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 1.6, 1.7
the range of the degree of [1,9], [1,8], [1,7], [1,6], [1,5]
each module [d−, d+]
the range of Prmax of each [0.1, 0.5], [0.1, 0.55], [0.1, 0.6],
module, [PM−, PM+] [0.1, 0.65], [0.1, 0.7]
Table 2: Experimental Settings (Synthetic).
Parameters Values
the number, n, of modules 50, 60, 70, 80, 90
the number, o, of transactions 50, 60, 70, 80, 90
the budget B 110, 130, 150, 170, 190
the CI level  1.6, 1.7, 1.8, 1.9, 2
the range of the degree of [1,9], [1,8], [1,7], [1,6], [1,5]
each module [d−, d+]
the range of the size of [11,15], [14,18], [17,21]
each module [s−, s+] [20,24], [23,27]
the range of the Prmax of [0.1, 0.2], [0.1, 0.35], [0.1, 0.5],
each module, [PM−, PM+] [0.1, 0.65], [0.1, 0.8]
Proof. Let Si,j be the set of strategies of players inPi,j andU(Si,j)
=
∑|Pi,j |
k=1 Uk(sk, sk). Thus,
U(Si,j)
|Pi,j | ≤ Φ(Si,j) ≤ U(Si.j). Let
S∗i,j be the globally optimal set of strategies of players in Pi,j that
maximizes U(Si,j) and let OPTi,j = U(S∗i,j). Let S
#
i,j be the set
of strategies of players in Pi,j that yields the maximum of Φ(Si,j),
i.e., the best Nash equilibrium of a game. Thus, U(S#i,j) ≥ Φ(S#i,j)
≥ Φ(S∗i,j) ≥ U(S
∗
i,j)
|Pi,j | =
OPTi,j
|Pi,j | . Therefore, PoS ≥
U(S
#
i,j)+dive
ω
i,j
OPTi,j+dive
ω
i,j
≥
1
|Pi,j | ·OPTi,j+dive
ω
i,j
OPTi,j+dive
ω
i,j
≥ 1|Pi,j | ≥
1
n
. Since mτ ⊆ rτ and
OPT ≤ B
Omin
, PoA ≥ diveτ
OPT
≥ Omin·diveτ
B
.
7. EXPERIMENTAL STUDY
7.1 Experiment Configuration
We use both real and synthetic data sets to test our proposed
approaches. Specifically, for real data sets, we retrieve the coins
in the blocks between 2028242 and 2028273 from the Monero
System. The time gap between the block 2028242 and the block
2028273 is one hour. There are 285 transactions and 633 coins.
Figure 5 shows the distribution of the number of coins in a trans-
action. Most transactions only output two coins and there are 4
transactions which output 16 coins. Since in Monero System, most
RS’s size is 11, we retrieve 627 coins among them and generate 57
super RSs. For each super RSs, it randomly selects 11 coins as its
coin set and its transaction set contains the transactions outputting
the selected 11 coins. We uniformly generate the degree of each su-
per SR within the range [d−, d+]. We generate the Prmax of each
super RS within the range [PM−, PM+] following the uniform
distribution. Since each super RS satisfies the -CI, we generate
the Prmin of each super RS by e
·(1−Prmax)
di·Prmax+1 =
1−Prmin
di·Prmin+1 . We
vary the budget from 40 to 120 and the CI level  from 1.3 to 1.7.
To examine the effects of the number of modules, the number
of historical transactions, and each module’s size, we generate the
synthetic dataset and run the experiments on it. For synthetic data
sets, we generate n modules. For each module, we randomly gen-
erate its degree, size, mixin set, Prmax and Prmin. We uniformly
generate the degree of each module within the range [d−, d+]. We
uniformly generate the size of each within the range of [s−, s+].
We generate the Prmax of each each module within the range
Figure 5: The Distribution of the Number of Coins in a Transaction
(a) Diversity (b) Running Time
Figure 6: Effect of the Budget (Real)
[PM−, PM+] following the uniform distribution. Since each mod-
ule satisfies the -CI, we generate the Prmin of each module by
e·(1−Prmax)
di·Prmax+1 =
1−Prmin
di·Prmin+1 . For each coin, among o historical
transactions, we randomly select a historical transaction outputting
it. We vary the budget from 110 to 190 and the CI level  from 1.6
to 2. We vary n from 50 to 90. Since the average size of each mod-
ule is 16, 50 modules cover more than 800 coins, which is large
enough for real-world applications. In Monero [15], as shown in
the real data sets, the number of coins in an hour is less than 800.
We conduct experiments on both the real data sets and the syn-
thetic data sets to evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of our
two approaches, the Game Theoretic Algorithm and the Progres-
sive Algorithm, in terms of the new RS’s diversity and the run-
ning time. As proved in Theorem 3.7, the CIA-MS-DS problem
is NP-hard, thus, it is infeasible to calculate the optimal result as
the ground truth in large scale datasets. Alternatively, we compare
our approaches with two baseline methods, the Greedy Algorithm
and the Random Algorithm. The Greedy Algorithm initializes rτ
asmτ and then greedily add the candidate module which can bring
the largest increase of the diversity of the temporary rτ among the
modules which would not make the temporary rτ ineligible to the
temporary rτ . The Random Algorithm initializes rτ as mτ and
then randomly add a candidate module among the modules which
would not make the temporary rτ ineligible to rτ .
Table 1 and Table 2 introduce our experiment settings on real
data sets and synthetic data sets respectively, where the default val-
ues of parameters are in bold font. In each set of experiments, we
vary one parameter, while setting other parameters to their default
values. For each experiment, we sample 50 problem instances and
run the algorithms. We report the average value of the running time
and the RS’s diversity. All our experiments were run on an Intel
CPU @2.2 GHz with 16GM RAM in Java.
7.2 Results on Real Data Sets
Effect of the Budget, B. Figure 6 illustrates the experimental
result on different budgets,B, from 40 to 120. In Figure 6(a), when
the budget gets larger from 40 to 80, the diversities of the new RSs
that generated by four approaches increase; then, they almost keep
stable. The reason is that at the beginning, with the increase of
B, the new RS can contain more mixins. Nevertheless, the new
RS is also constrained by the -CIK constraint. When the budget
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Figure 7: Effect of the CI Level (Real)
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Figure 8: Effect of the Range of the Degree of each Super RS (Real)
is large enough, the diversity of the new RS is limited by the -
CIK constraint. And particularly, when the budget is very low, the
diversity of the new RS which is generated by the Progressive Al-
gorithm is lower than that of the new RS which is generated by the
Game Theoretic Algorithm. Because when the budget is low, the
Progressive Algorithm needs to adjust the selection from the δ-KP
algorithm, Ci,j , for the budget constraint (line 11-15). When the
budget is very low, the diversity of the new RS which is adjusted by
the greedy procedure in the Progressive Algorithm is not as good
as that of the Game Algorithm. The reason is that, the greedy pro-
cedure is easier to fall into the local optimal trap while the Game
Theoretic Algorithm can release this by the games between players.
As shown in Figure 6(b), when the budget increases, the running
time of two baseline approaches also increases. The increase of B
allows the new RS to contain more mixins, which thus leads to the
higher complexity of the CIA-MS-DS problem and the increase of
the running time. However, the running time of the Game Theoretic
Algorithm decrease. The reason is that, when the budget constraint
is relaxed, the game in the Game Theoretic Algorithm is easier to
reach the Nash equilibrium. The running time of the Progressive
Algorithm increases at the beginning. Because when the budget
increases but still is a strict constraint, the Progressive Algorithm
spends more time on the greedy procedure. But later, when the bud-
get is large enough, the running time of the Progressive Algorithm
decreases. The reason is that, when the budget is large enough, the
budget constraint is relaxed and there are more Ci,j whose size are
smaller than the budget and the Progressive Algorithm do not need
to run the greedy procedure for these candidate RSs.
Effect of the CI Level, . Figure 7 illustrates the experimental
result on different CI levels, , from 1.3 to 1.7. In Figure 7(a),
when the  increases, the diversities of the new RSs that generated
by four approaches also increase. The reason is that the increase
of  makes the -CIK constraint more relaxed and the new RS has
more valid modules. As shown in Figure 7(b), when the  increases,
the running time of four approaches also increases. Because, the
increase of  let the new RS has more valid modules, which thus
leads to the higher complexity of the CIA-MS-DS problem and the
increase of the running time.
Effect of the Range of the Degree of each Super RS, [d−, d+].
Figure 8 illustrates the experimental results on different ranges,
[d−, d+], of the degree of each super RS, from [1,9] to [1,5]. In Fig-
ure 8(a), the diversities of the new RSs that generated by our four
(a) Diversity (b) Running Time
Figure 9: Effect of the Range of the Prmax of each Super RS (Real)
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Figure 10: Effect of the Number of Modules (Synthetic)
approaches increase, when the average value of degrees of modules
decreases. The reason is that, when the average value of degrees of
modules is higher, it is more difficult to satisfy the -CIK constraint.
In other words, the new RS has fewer valid modules. In Figure 8(b),
the running time of our four approaches increases when the average
value of degrees of modules decreases. Because when the average
value of degrees of modules increases, the new RS has fewer valid
modules, which thus leads to lower complexity of the CIA-MS-DS
problem and the decrease of the running time.
Effect of the Range of the Prmax of each Super RS, [PM−,
PM+]. Figure 9 illustrates the experimental results on different
ranges, [PM−, PM+], of thePrmax of each module, from [0.1,0.5]
to [0.1,0.7]. In Figure 9(a), the diversities of the new RSs that gen-
erated by our four approaches decrease, when the range is wider.
The reason is that, when the range of the Prmax of each module is
wider, it is more difficult to satisfy the -CIK constraint. In other
words, the new RS has fewer valid modules. In Figure 9(b), the
running time of our four approaches decreases when the difference
of the Prmax of modules increases. The reason is that, when the
range of the Prmax of modules is narrower, the new RS has more
valid modules, which thus leads to higher complexity of the CIA-
MS-DS problem and the increase of the running time. Specifically,
compared with the Game Theoretic Algorithm, the Progressive Al-
gorithm is more sensitive about the change of the range. The reason
is that, when the range is wider, the cardinality of Mi,j is smaller
and the running time of the δ-KP Algorithm is smaller.
7.3 Results on Synthetic Data Sets
To examine the effects of the number of modules, the number
of historical transactions, and each module’s size, we generate the
synthetic dataset and run the experiments on it. We also test the
effects of the budget, the CI level, the range of the degree of each
module, and the range of the Prmax of each module on the syn-
thetic data sets. Due to the space limitation, please refer to Ap-
pendix F of our technical report [27] for details.
Effect of the Number, n of Modules. Figure 10 illustrates the
experimental result on a different number, n, of modules from 50
to 90. In Figure 10(a), when the number of modules increases, the
diversities of the new RSs that generated by four approaches also
increase. The reason is that the increase of n let the new RS has
more valid modules. Specifically, our two approximate algorithms
achieve better results than the two baseline algorithms. The RS
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Figure 11: Effect of the Number of Historical Transactions (Synthetic)
which is generated by the Progressive Algorithm has the largest
diversity. As shown in Figure 10(b), when the number of modules
increases, the running time of four approaches increases. When the
number of modules increases, the new RS has more valid modules,
which thus lead to the increase of the running time. Specifically,
the Progressive Algorithm’s running time is the highest while the
running time of the Game Theoretic Algorithm is much lower.
Effect of the Number, o of Historical Transactions. Figure 11
illustrates the experimental result on a different number, o, of his-
torical transactions from 60 to 100. In Figure 11(a), when the num-
ber of historical transactions increases, the diversities of new RSs
that generated by four approaches also increase. The reason is that
the increase of o decreases the overlap between historical transac-
tion set of modules, where the historical transaction set of a mod-
ule is the set of historical transaction outputting the coins in the
module. As shown in Figure 11(b), when the number of historical
transactions increases, the running time of four approaches almost
keeps stable. Because the complexity of the CIA-MS-DS problem
and the time complexities of four approaches are all not related to
the number of historical transactions.
Effect of the Range of the Size of each Module, [s−, s+].
Figure 12 illustrates the experimental results on different ranges,
[s−, s+], of the size of each module, from [11,15] to [23,27]. In
Figure 12(a), the diversities of the new RSs that generated by our
four approaches decrease, when the size of each module increases.
The reason is that, when the average value of sizes of modules is
higher, it is more difficult to satisfy the budget constraint. In other
words, the new RS has fewer valid modules. In Figure 12(b), the
running time of our Progressive Algorithm and two baseline ap-
proaches decreases when the average value of sizes of modules
increases. The reason is that, when the average value of sizes of
modules is higher, the new RS has fewer valid modules, which thus
leads to lower complexity of the CIA-MS-DS problem and the de-
crease of the running time. However, the running time of our Game
Theoretic Algorithm increases when the average value of sizes of
modules increases. The reason is that, when the average value of
sizes of modules is higher, the Game Theoretic Algorithm needs to
do more games to reach the Nash equilibrium.
We finally summarize our findings as following:
• Our two approximate algorithms can achieve results with higher
diversity compared with that of two baselines.
• The Progressive Algorithm outputs the RS with the highest di-
versity while it costs much time. But its speed is still acceptable
for the current public blockchain systems, like Monero [15].
• The Game Theoretic Algorithm outputs the RS with high diver-
sity quickly. Compared with the Progressive Algorithm, it is
suitable for consortium blockchain systems with high TPSs.
8. RELATED WORK
Blockchain technologies are gaining massive momentum in re-
cent years, largely due to its immutability and transparency. Many
applications for security trading and settlement [28], asset and fi-
nance management [29] [30], banking and insurance [31] are eval-
uated. However, the transparency character also brings the privacy
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Figure 12: Effect of the Range of the Size of each Module (Synthetic)
problem. In many practice applications, users do not want to share
all their information with other participants. To solve the privacy
problem, some researchers have proposed some privacy-preserved
blockchain systems.
These works can be classified into two categories. The works in
the first category focus on developing mixing protocols [32, 33, 34,
35]. In these protocols, anonymous service providers use mixing
protocols to confuse the trails of transactions. The client’s funds are
divided into smaller parts which are mixed randomly with similar
random parts of other clients. This helps to break links between the
users and the transactions they purchased while these methods rely
on mixers’ trustiness and the mixers know the transactions’ privacy.
These methods weaken the blockchain system’s decentration.
The works in the second category focus on developing advanced
encryption methods. In the Monero blockchain system [14], the re-
searchers build the privacy-preserved blockchain system based on
the Ring Confidential Transaction (RingCT) [12] [13] [14]. In the
first version of RingCT [12] (RingCT 1.0), the researchers adapted
a RS scheme [36] to protect the transaction’s sender’s identity. In
the second version of RingCT [13], the researchers put forward a
new efficient RingCT protocol (RingCT 2.0), which is built upon
the well-known Pedersen commitment [37] and saves almost half
RS’s size compared with former version RingCT. In [14], the re-
searchers put forward the newest RingCT protocol based on Bullet-
proof [38], which decreases the RS’s size from O(n) to O(logn).
While these cryptographic techniques are used to some extent
achieve confidentiality, the considerable overhead of such tech-
niques makes them impractical [39]. Besides, these techniques as-
sume the adversary has no extra information. However, since all
data in the blockchain system is accessed, adversaries can attack a
user’s privacy by analyzing the traffic flow on the blockchain sys-
tem. Our work considers the traffic flow’s impact and proposes
methods to strengthen RSs’ privacy-preserving effect by selecting
a set of desirable mixins.
9. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we formulate a differential privacy definition, namely
-coin-indistinguishability, in blockchain scenarios. We show that,
if a RS satisfies the -coin-indistinguishability, it is resistant to the
“Chain-Reaction” analysis. Besides, in this paper, we formulate the
coin-indistinguishability-aware mixin selection problem with the
disjoint-superset constraint (CIA-MS-DS), which aims to find a set
of mixins which satisfies the -coin-indistinguishability constraint,
as well as the budget constraint, and has the maximal diversity.
We formally prove that the CIA-MS-DS problem has some signif-
icant properties which can help to simplify the problem, while the
CIA-MS-DS problem still is an NP-hard problem. To efficiently
and effectively solve the CIA-MS-DS problem, we propose a novel
framework, CoinMagic, and propose two approximate algorithms,
namely the Progressive Algorithm and the Game Algorithm, with
theoretical guarantees. When evaluated on the real and synthetic
data sets, our approaches achieved clearly better performance than
two baseline algorithms.
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APPENDIX
A. RESULTS ON SYNTHETIC DATA SETS
Effect of the Budget, B. Figure 13 illustrates the experimental
result on different budgets, B, from 110 to 190. In Figure 13(a),
when the budget gets larger from 110 to 170, the diversities of the
new ring signatures that generated by the four approaches increase;
then, they almost keep stable. The reason is that at the beginning,
with the increase of B, the new ring signature can contain more
mixins. Nevertheless, the new ring signature is also constrained
by the -CIK constraint. When the budget is large enough, the
new ring signature’s diversity is limited by the -CIK constraint.
As shown in Figure 13(b), when the budget increases, the running
time of four approaches also increases. Because the increase of B
allows the new ring signature to contain more mixins, which thus
leads to the higher complexity of the CIA-MS-DS problem and the
increase of the running time. However, when the budget gets larger
from 170 to 190, the running time of our Game Algorithm and
Progressive Algorithm both decrease. The reason is that, when the
budget constraint is relaxed, the game in the Game Algorithm is
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Figure 13: Effect of the Budget (Synthetic)
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Figure 14: Effect of the CI Level (Synthetic)
easier to reach the Nash equilibrium and the Progressive Algorithm
costs less time to alter the ring signature after the δ-KP for the
budget constraint.
Effect of the CI Level, . Figure 14 illustrates the experimental
result on different CI levels, , from 1.6 to 2. In Figure 14(a), when
the  increases, the diversities of the new ring signatures that gen-
erated by the four approaches also increase. The reason is that the
increase of  makes the -CIK constraint more relaxed and the new
ring signature has more valid modules. As shown in Figure 14(b),
when the  increases, the running time of four approaches also in-
creases. Because the increase of  let the new ring signature has
more valid modules, which thus leads to the higher complexity of
the CIA-MS-DS problem and the increase of the running time.
Effect of the Range of each Module’s Degree, [d−, d+]. Fig-
ure 15 illustrates the experimental results on different ranges, [d−, d+],
of each module’s degree, from [1,9] to [1,5]. In Figure 15(a), the
diversities of the new ring signatures that generated by our four
approaches increase, when the average value of modules’ degrees
decreases. The reason is that, when the average value of modules’
degree is higher, it is more difficult to satisfy the -CIK constraint.
In other words, the new ring signature has fewer valid modules.
In Figure 15(b), the running time of our four approaches increases
when the average value of modules’ degree decreases. The reason
is that, when the average value of modules’ degree is higher, the
new ring signature has fewer valid modules, which thus leads to
lower complexity of the CIA-MS-DS problem and the decrease of
the running time.
Effect of the Range of each Module’s Prmax, [PM−, PM+].
Figure 16 illustrates the experimental results on different ranges,
[PM−, PM+], of each module’s prmax, from [0.1,0.2] to [0.1,0.8].
In Figure 16(a), the diversities of the new ring signatures that gen-
erated by our four approaches decreases, when the range is wider.
The reason is that, when the range of modules’ size is wider, it is
more difficult to satisfy the -CIK constraint. In other words, the
new ring signature has fewer valid modules. In Figure 16(b), the
running time of our four approaches decreases when the difference
of modules’ Prmax increases. The reason is that, when the range
of modules’ Prmax is wider, the new ring signature has less valid
modules, which thus leads to the lower complexity of the CIA-MS-
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Figure 15: Effect of the Range of each Module’s Degree (Synthetic)
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Figure 16: Effect of the Range of each Module’s Prmax (Synthetic)
DS problem and the decrease of the running time. Specifically,
compared with the Game Algorithm, the Progressive Algorithm is
more sensitive about the change of the range. The reason is that,
when the range is wider, the cardinality of Mi,j is smaller and the
running time of the δ-KP Algorithm is smaller.
14
